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I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years have been stressful for investors, and
perhaps no less so for corporate managers. In March 2000, the
†
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tech stock bubble burst, inflicting financial pain on corporate and
2
middle America. The following year, the public’s faith in the
integrity of the financial markets was shaken when a scandal
erupted regarding the integrity of research reports from securities
3
analysts at several major brokerage firms. Later that year, Enron
Corp. declared bankruptcy after revelations of financial
4
manipulation and what appeared to be accounting fraud. The
Enron disaster took with it one of the nation’s largest and most5
respected accounting firms, Arthur Andersen. More bad news
soon began to surface about other large companies, including
some that were recently the market’s biggest success stories,
6
7
including Worldcom and Adelphia.
In mid-2002, Congress
1. For example, shortly before the bubble burst, America Online (“AOL”)
had agreed to acquire Time Warner in a stock exchange. When announced on
January 10, 2000, the transaction was valued at $160 billion based on AOL’s stock
price. See Steven Lipkin & Kara Scannell, Deals & Deal Makers: The Deal, Week 2:
Time Warner, Media Firms Look Like Winners, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at C17. After
the bubble burst, the completed merger was worth just $106 billion. A few years
after the acquisition, AOL Time Warner changed its name back to Time Warner
and the stock symbol from AOL to TWX, Time Warner’s symbol before the
acquisition. Recent Changes in Stock Listings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at C5.
2. Investor losses following the bubble’s burst are estimated at $3 trillion.
Jonathon Clements, Getting Going, Learning Lessons from Market Losses, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 5, 2000, at C1. The Wilshire Total Market Index would show a decline of
more than $7 trillion between March 24, 2000 and July 18, 2002. Joel Seligman,
No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 449, 517 n.51 (2002) (citing Seth W. Feaster, The Incredible Shrinking Stock
Market, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 14).
3. See Steve Liesman et al., When Rules Keep Debt Off the Books, Enron Crisis Puts
Spotlight on the FASB, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2002, at C1; Joel Seligman, No One Can
Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449,
451 (2002); Robert Strauss, Investing; Asking Directions at Wall & Broad, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2001, § 3, at 12.
4. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron’s Collapse: The
Overview; Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001,
at A1; Richard B. Schmitt, Fall of a Power Giant: Burst of Chapter 11 Filings Marks Big
Year for the Bankruptcy Bar, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at A10.
5. See Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2002) (“Arthur
Anderson has been virtually shut down by its conviction for Enron-related
obstruction of justice . . . .”); Robert Frank & Ken Brown, Andersen: Just a Shadow of
Its Former Self, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2002, at C1.
6. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 329, 333 (2003); Jared Sandberg et al., Worldcom Admits $3.8 Billion Error in
Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., Jun. 26, 2002, at A1.
7. Frank C. Allen, Jr., Legal Compliance in Maritime Operations: Charting Your
Course Through Stormy Waters—2003 and Beyond, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2003);
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responded by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the “Act”
8
or “SOX”). The Act’s principal objective was to restore faith in the
financial markets chiefly by improving the reliability of issuer
9
disclosure. To accomplish this goal, SOX established a board to
oversee firms providing auditing services to public companies,
required auditing firms to remain strictly independent of the
companies they audit, increased the responsibilities of issuer audit
committees, required certification of financial statements by
management, specified additional and improved disclosure and
financial reporting, prohibited certain activities by issuer
management, created new financial crimes, and enhanced civil and
criminal penalties for misdeeds already defined.
Whether the goals of SOX will be accomplished only time will
10
tell.
What already is clear, however, is that it represents the
farthest-reaching reform of federal securities law since the
enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934
11
Act”). Indeed, SOX is not limited to federal securities law but, as
we shall see, extends its reach to state corporation law as well. As is
common in securities law, large portions of the Act do not
themselves create substantive regulation, but, rather, authorize the
S.E.C. to adopt implementing rules. At this writing, the S.E.C. has
adopted rules addressing most areas under SOX, but more rules
are pending. This article will address only final rules the S.E.C. has
adopted; it will not address proposed rules because the history of
S.E.C. rulemaking reveals that rules often are substantially changed
before being adopted.
SOX covers all issuers—domestic and foreign—with securities
12
registered under the 1934 Act section 12. It also covers issuers
Jerry Markon & Peter Grant, Prosecutors to Seek Indictments of 5 Former Adelphia
Executives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002, at A8.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to
be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and
29 U.S.C.).
9. Id. Preamble to Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
10. SOX did not succeed in preventing or inducing discontinuance of longstanding abuses in the mutual fund industry, which came to light beginning in late
2003. See Michael Schroeder, New Rules for Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2003,
at D1 (discussing potential reforms resembling Sarbanes-Oxley). Deborah
Solomon, SEC Chairman Defends Decision to Quickly Settle Putnam Charges, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 18, 2003, at D9 (describing criticism of the SEC for failing to uncover above
in the fund industry sooner).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000).
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. at 747 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7201). Section 12 requires registration of securities that are traded on a national
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required by section 15(d) of that Act to file reports, whether or not
13
Finally, SOX
they have securities registered under section 12.
covers companies that file a registration statement under the
14
Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”). In this article all such
issuers are referred to simply as “issuers.”
It is the goal of this article to provide a brief reference to the
multitude of changes in the law wrought by SOX. The author’s
hope is that this will be of use to students, scholars, and
practitioners seeking an overview of the extensive changes resulting
from this legislation. The discussion is broader than it is deep;
indeed, a work attempting to examine SOX in depth would soon
become a treatise and not just an article. The remainder of this
article, then, will seek to provide a big-picture view of SOX: Part II
of this article will address SOX regulation of professionals,
including accountants, lawyers, and securities analysts. Part III will
address SOX’s attempts to enhance corporate disclosure. Part IV
will examine SOX’s efforts to reform corporate governance. Part V
will examine SOX’s provisions dealing with enforcement of the law.
Finally, Part VI will provide a brief conclusion.
II. SOX REGULATION OF PROFESSIONALS
The cornerstone of SOX is increased oversight of the
accounting and legal professions, as well as some additional
regulation of securities analysts. Of these, the most dramatic
changes are in the regulation of issuers’ accountants.
A. Regulation of Accountants
Post-SOX, accountants are subject to regulation by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board.
In addition, SOX
prescribes detailed rules designed to ensure auditor independence
from issuers.

stock exchange or have reached a certain size in total assets and number of
shareholders. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (b) (2000).
13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 2(a)(7), 116 Stat. at 747 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7201).
14. Id. The 1933 Act generally requires persons proposing to offer securities
to the public to file a registration statement with the S.E.C. prior to offering any of
the securities. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e)(c)(2000).
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1. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
SOX establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight
15
Board as a self-regulatory organization (“SRO”), similar in many
respects to other SROs such as the New York Stock Exchange and
16
the National Association of Securities Dealers. In addition, SOX
prohibits certain relationships between auditors and their clients,
17
discussed below, that might create a conflict of interest or provide
a motive for the auditors to be less than exacting in their audit.
Formally, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(the “Board”) is not an agency of the U.S. government; it is a
18
nonprofit corporation organized under the District of Columbia
19
20
Nonprofit Corporation Act. The Board comprises five members,
of which two must—and only two may—be certified public
21
accountants. If the chair is a CPA, he or she may not have been
practicing as such for at least five years before being appointed to
22
Board members serve five-year terms, with one
the Board.
23
member’s term expiring each year. No member may serve more
24
than two terms on the Board.
The duties of the Board include: registering public accounting
firms that prepare audit reports for issuers; establishing standards
for audit reports, including standards for auditing, quality control,
ethics, independence, and others as the Board deems appropriate;
inspecting registered accounting firms; investigating and

15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(a), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7211).
16. The SROs design, implement and enforce their own rules after giving
notice to and receiving comment from the S.E.C. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000). The
SROs also enforce S.E.C. rules and regulations over brokers, dealers, and others.
Id. § 78s(g). In that respect, the SROs play an important role in diverting
enforcement efforts from the overburdened S.E.C. The S.E.C. maintains
supremacy over the SROs by reserving authority to review the SROs rules, by
requiring that the SROs provide the S.E.C. with notice of final disciplinary actions,
and by hearing appeals from SRO decisions. Id. § 78s.
17. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(b), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7211).
19. Id. See District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §
29-501-599.16 (1981 & Supp. 1995).
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101(e)(1), 116 Stat. at 750 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7211).
21. Id. § 101(e)(2).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 101(e)(5)(A).
24. Id. § 101(e)(5)(B).
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conducting disciplinary proceedings regarding registered
accounting firms; enforcing SOX with respect to registered
accounting firms; and doing such other things that the Board or
the S.E.C. consider “necessary or appropriate to promote high
professional standards among, and to improve the quality of audit
25
services provided by, registered accounting firms.”
Any public accounting firm that wants to prepare or issue an
audit report for an issuer (or even “participate in the preparation
26
or issuance of” such a report) must register with the Board. An
accounting firm’s application for registration must contain the
accounting firm’s consent to cooperate with the Board and to
produce documents and testimony to the Board, at the latter’s
27
request, or risk having its registration revoked.
In effect, this
means that all issuers subject to SOX can be investigated by the
Board, as documents produced by a registered accounting firm
could (and probably would) relate to an audit report for an issuer.
In furtherance of its mission, the Board is empowered to
establish standards for auditing, certifying and conducting quality
28
control regarding audits and ethics for public accounting firms.
SOX prescribes minimum standards, however, that the Board must
establish. With respect to audits, SOX mandates that audit work
29
papers must be kept for at least seven years. In addition to the
person in charge of the audit, a second person qualified under the
Board’s rules (normally another person from the firm) must
30
approve each audit report the registered accounting firm issues.
Finally, each audit report must include a report of the testing of the
31
issuer’s internal control processes and procedures.
With respect to quality control of accounting and auditing
standards, SOX requires the Board to establish standards
addressing the monitoring of professional ethics and
independence from audit clients; consultation regarding
accounting and auditing questions within the firm; hiring,
education, and promotion of personnel; agreeing to perform, and
performance of, accounting and auditing services; and internal
25. Id. § 101(c).
26. Id. § 102(a), 116 Stat. at 753 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7212).
27. Id. § 102(b)(3).
28. Id. § 103(a)(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 755 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7213).
29. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i).
30. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii).
31. Id. § 103(a)(2)(A)(ii). Regarding internal controls, see infra notes 107-110
and accompanying text.
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32

inspection and control.
In furtherance of its powers to regulate the accounting
profession, the Board must conduct a program of inspections to
ensure the registered firms are in compliance with SOX, the
33
Board’s rules, the S.E.C.’s rules, and professional standards. The
Board, in addition to its power to inspect, also has sweeping powers
of investigation and discipline, related not only to violations of its
own rules, but also to violations and suspected violations of the
securities laws, the S.E.C.’s rules, and professional accounting
34
standards. The Board may demand testimony and production of
documents from registered firms or their client(s), and can seek a
subpoena from the S.E.C. compelling testimony or production of
35
documents if necessary.
The Board may refer matters to the
S.E.C., and, at the latter’s direction, to other authorities, including
36
the Justice Department (for criminal violations). The Board has
the power to impose discipline on registered firms and associated
37
persons, if it finds a violation of applicable law, rules, or standards.
The nature of the discipline the Board may impose depends on the
nature of the violation; the most severe violations (those
categorized as “intentional” or “knowing”) can result in both a
permanent bar from auditing issuers as well as substantial money
38
penalties.
Lesser violations may result in censure, mandatory
training, money penalties, and other sanctions, as the Board
39
determines.
2. Auditor Independence
In addition to establishing the Board, SOX contains detailed
rules, designed to ensure auditors’ independence from their issuer
clients. Certain services by auditors are prohibited outright; those
not prohibited are subject to pre-approval by the issuer’s
independent audit committee. Furthermore, audit partners (but,
at this time, not audit firms) must rotate periodically, and the
auditors must report to the audit committee, thereby enabling that

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. § 103(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 104(a), 116 Stat. at 757 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7214).
Id. § 105(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 759 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215).
Id. § 105(b)(2).
Id. § 105(b)(4)(B).
Id. § 105(c)(4).
Id. § 105(c)(4),(5).
Id. § 105(c)(4).
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committee to monitor the relationship between management and
the auditors. Finally, the employment by the issuer of former
auditor employees is limited.
a. Prohibited Services
Congress was concerned that the financial scandals of 2001-02
were caused partly because auditors had become too cozy with their
clients. SOX therefore contains provisions designed to ensure that
auditors remain independent, so that audit reports represent an
impartial conclusion regarding the accuracy of the clients’ financial
statements. Of particular concern to Congress were the possible
conflicts of interest generated when auditors provide non-audit
services to issuers, and SOX prohibits auditors from providing
40
Prohibited
certain non-audit services to their audit clients.
services include: (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the
accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (2)
financial information systems design and implementation; (3)
appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contributionin-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human
resources; (7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment
banking services; (8) legal services and expert services unrelated to
the audit; and (9) any other service that the Board determines, by
41
regulation, is impermissible.
b. Services Requiring Pre-Approval
The services that are not prohibited outright must, in general,
be pre-approved by the issuer’s audit committee before an outside
42
auditor may perform them. The audit committee may delegate
the power to pre-approve services to one or more members who are
43
independent directors.
If, however, the delegated power is
exercised, the delegated pre-approvals must be presented to the
44
full audit committee at the next scheduled meeting.
40. Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771-72 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1)
(adding § 10A(g) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
41. Id. § 201(g). See Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002)
(restricting the services an auditor may provide to issuers).
42. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
43. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(3) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
44. Id.
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The requirement of pre-approval applies to both audit and
45
non-audit services. “Audit services” include comfort letters issued
in connection with the issuer’s offering securities, and thus go
46
beyond the typical understanding of services included in an audit.
Excluded from the pre-approval requirement (but still requiring
approval) are certain de minimus non-audit services, if they (1)
account for less than five percent of the fees paid to the auditor by
the issuer in the year in which they were rendered, (2) were not
recognized as non-audit services at the time the outside auditors
were engaged, (3) are promptly brought to the audit committee’s
attention, and (4) are approved before the completion of the
47
audit. Finally, not only do all non-audit services need to be
approved (most of them in advance), but their approval must be
disclosed in the issuer’s periodic reports filed under 1934 Act
48
section 13(a).
c. Rotation of Audit Partners
SOX contemplates that a registered accounting firm auditing
an issuer will have one person responsible for supervising the audit
49
and one person responsible for reviewing the supervisor’s work.
Neither of these persons may provide audit services to the issuer for
50
more than five consecutive years. Rotation of audit firms is not
required; however, the Comptroller General of the United States is
directed by SOX to study the pros and cons of rotating audit firms
51
and to report to Congress.
d. Auditor Reports to Audit Committee
Outside auditors must timely report to the issuer’s audit
committee regarding: (1) all critical accounting policies and
practices to be used; (2) alternative treatments of financial
information (within GAAP) that have been discussed with
45. Id.
46. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
47. Id. (adding § 10A(i)(1)(B) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See
Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002) (restricting the services
an auditor may provide to issuers).
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
49. Id. § 203, 116 Stat. at 773 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l) (adding §
10A(j) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 207(a)(b), 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7232).
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management, the ramifications of such alternative treatments, and
the auditor’s preferred treatment; and (3) all other material
52
written communications between management and the auditors.
This has the effect of putting all material communications between
management of the issuer and the outside auditors before the audit
committee, which can thereby review the relationship between
those two entities and ensure the independence of the auditors.
e.

Issuer Employment of Auditor Staff

Because an issuer’s outside accountants have in-depth
knowledge of the issuer and the challenges it faces, it is not
uncommon for personnel from an issuer’s accounting firm later to
take employment with the issuer. To guard against conflicts of
interest, however, SOX prohibits an accounting firm from auditing
an issuer if the issuer’s CEO, CFO, controller, or chief accounting
officer was employed by the accounting firm and participated in
any capacity in the issuer’s audit within the preceding twelve
53
months.
f.

Study of Principles-Based Accounting

Accounting in the United States is largely “rule-based,”
meaning it is governed by rules that define as precisely as possible
54
Unlike the United States,
the resolution of accounting issues.
many countries have “principles-based” accounting, meaning that
accounting is done under a set of principles that provide policy
55
guidance for resolving individual issues. Each approach has its
52. Id. § 204, 116 Stat. at 773 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (adding §
10A(k) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See Rule 2-07 of Regulation S-X,
17 C.F.R. § 210.2-07 (2002).
53. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 206, 116 Stat. at 774-775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1) (adding § 10A(l) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
54. The rules of U.S. accounting are codified as “generally accepted
accounting principles” (GAAP). United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 811 n.7 (1984) (describing GAAP as “the conventions, rules and procedures
that define accepted accounting practices”). The Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) promulgates GAAP standards. See Financial Accounting Standards
Board, available at http://www.fasb.org/ (last visited May 19, 2004) (“The mission
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board is to establish and improve standards
of financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and education of the
public . . . .”).
55. See Fredrick Gill, Principles-Based Accounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 967 (2003); Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting
Standards, and the Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L.
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strengths and weaknesses. After the financial scandals of 2001-02,
however, some observers believed that the U.S. rule-based system
encouraged issuers and accountants to stray too close to the edge,
56
complying with the letter of the rule while avoiding its spirit. The
rules might communicate precisely what not to do in order to avoid
breaking the law, leaving it open for issuers and their auditors to
accomplish the same result by other means. Section 108(d) of
SOX directs the S.E.C. to study the possibility of implementing a
principles-based accounting system in the United States, and to
57
report to Congress on the results.
If the S.E.C. were to
recommend changing to a principles-based system, and Congress
and the Board were to concur, it likely would be the most dramatic
reform of financial reporting in the history of the United States.
B. Regulation of Lawyers
To this point we have addressed the extensive regulation of
accountants imposed by SOX. SOX also addresses the professional
responsibility of lawyers, although in a less comprehensive manner.
There is not, for example, a body similar to the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to register attorneys practicing before
the S.E.C., nor are the duties applicable to attorneys spelled out in
as much detail as they are for accountants. Nevertheless, section
307 of SOX requires the S.E.C. to adopt rules “setting forth
58
minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys . . . .”
As the following sections will reveal, the S.E.C.’s rules regarding
attorneys are complex and require careful attention by
59
practitioners. S.E.C. regulation of attorneys has been controversial
60
in the past, and the controversy is likely to continue under SOX.
341 (2002).
56. See S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 13 (2002); FASB, Proposal, Principles-Based
Approach to U.S. Standard Setting (Oct. 21, 2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/
proposals/principles-based_approach.pdf (last visited May 19, 2004).
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d), 116 Stat. at 768 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77s).
58. Id. § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245).
59. See S.E.C. Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2002). The Rules of
Practice set out standards for attorneys practicing before the S.E.C. and authorize
the S.E.C. to suspend or disbar attorneys who violate those standards. Id. §
201.102. The most commonly addressed violations include: lack of qualifications,
defect of personal character, unethical conduct, and the violation of securities
laws. Id. § 201.102(e)(1).
60. See, e.g., In re George C. Kern, Jr. (Allied Stores Corp.), Admin. Proc. File
No. 3-6869 (Nov. 14, 1988) [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH);
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1. “Up-the-ladder” Reporting
SOX mandates “up-the-ladder” reporting of a material
violation of securities law, breach of fiduciary duty, or similar
violation by the issuer or any of its agents. Up-the-ladder reporting
means that the lawyer who becomes aware of material evidence of
such a violation must report it (a) first, to the chief legal officer of
the issuer, and if that person does not provide an appropriate
response, then (b) further, to the audit committee or another
61
board committee composed of only independent directors. Upthe-ladder reporting is not triggered, however, until the lawyer has
“evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of
62
fiduciary duty or similar violation . . . .” The phrases “evidence of
a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or
similar violation” and “appropriate response” are critical, as they
trigger the requirement to report up the ladder.
a. “Evidence of Material Violation”
63

The S.E.C.’s new professional conduct rules define “evidence
of a material violation” as “credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely
that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to
64
occur.”
b. “Breach of Fiduciary Duty”
Under the S.E.C.’s professional conduct rules, “breach of
fiduciary duty refers to any breach of fiduciary or similar duty to
the issuer recognized under an applicable federal or state statute or
at common law, including but not limited to misfeasance,
nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse of trust, and approval of
65
unlawful transactions.”

In re Carter and Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471 (1981).
61. Sarbanes Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7245).
62. Id.
63. Standards for Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. pt.
205 (2003) (adopting standards required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e).
65. Id. § 205.2(d).
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c. “Appropriate Response”
This term is important because if the reporting lawyer
determines that the response she receives is not appropriate, she is
required to go further up the ladder to the audit or other board
committee. For purposes of the professional conduct rules,
“ ‘appropriate response’ means a response to an attorney regarding
reported evidence of a material violation as a result of which the
attorney reasonably believes: (1) That no material violation . . . has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur”; (2) that the issuer has
taken appropriate measures to remedy or prevent material
violations; or (3) “that the issuer has . . . retained or directed an
attorney to review the reported evidence of a material violation”
and either has substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by the attorney or the attorney may assert
a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer or agent in any
proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a material
66
violation.
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and “Noisy Withdrawal”
One of the more controversial aspects of the S.E.C.’s efforts to
regulate lawyers has been its attempts to force lawyers to report
wrongdoing by their clients to the government; this raises issues
about attorney-client privilege when, for example, the attorney has
67
learned of past wrongdoing in a privileged communication. SOX
preserves attorney-client privilege because up-the-ladder reporting
remains within the corporate client (e.g., to chief legal officer, audit
committee, etc.), and the reporting attorney has not thereby
violated the privilege. If the lawyer were required to report to third
parties, however, such a report might well violate the privilege and
that could leave the lawyer open to professional discipline under
state law.
What happens if lawyers report up the ladder to no avail? As
originally proposed, the rules implementing SOX section 307
required such lawyers to withdraw from representation of the
client, to notify the S.E.C. that they had done so for ethical reasons,
66. Id. § 205.2(b).
67. The American Bar Association’s Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 forbids an
attorney’s disclosure of a client’s past acts if that information was gained through a
privileged attorney-client communication. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 (2002).
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and to disaffirm any questionable S.E.C. filings the issuer has
68
Such a withdrawal is called “noisy” because of the
made.
requirement that the withdrawing lawyer notify the S.E.C. and
disaffirm filings. Because they require some reporting to third
parties (namely, the S.E.C.), the noisy withdrawal rules might
require lawyers to violate the attorney-client privilege and,
unsurprisingly, the rules drew a firestorm of criticism from the
69
bar. After the reaction of the bar became known, a revised “noisy
70
withdrawal” rule was proposed. The S.E.C. has not taken action
on the new proposals yet, but securities lawyers eventually may
71
become subject to a noisy withdrawal requirement in some form.
3. Statutory Basis for Attorney Discipline
72

Rule 102(e) of the S.E.C.’s Rules of Practice gives the S.E.C.
73
authority to discipline attorneys practicing before it. Before SOX
was passed, the S.E.C. did not have an express statutory basis for
this rule, but rather relied on its general rulemaking powers and its
74
inherent authority under the securities laws. Section 602 of SOX,
however, essentially codifies rule 102(e) and thereby provides an
explicit statutory basis for the Commission’s power to discipline
75
attorneys.
a. Appearing and Practicing Before the S.E.C.
The S.E.C. has disciplinary powers over lawyers “appearing and
68. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8150 (proposed Nov. 21, 2002), 67 Fed.
Reg.
71,
670,
71,
673
(Dec.
2,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
69. See Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6296
(Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm (last
visited May 19, 2004).
70. Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8186 (Jan. 29, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6324
(Feb. 6, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm (last
visited May 19, 2004).
71. Id.
72. 17 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2002) (predating Sarbanes-Oxley).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2004).
74. Judicial review of the S.E.C.’s rulemaking authority has been favorable to
the S.E.C. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. S.E.C., 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 747, 794
(2002) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3) (amended by adding § 4C(a) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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76

practicing before [it] in any way.”
The S.E.C.’s rules define
“appearing and practicing” as follows:
(i) Transacting any business with the Commission,
including communications in any form; (ii) Representing
an issuer in a Commission administrative proceeding or in
connection with any Commission investigation, inquiry,
information request, or subpoena; (iii) Providing advice
in respect of the United States securities laws or the
[S.E.C.’s] rules or regulations thereunder regarding any
document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or
submitted to, or incorporated into any document that will
be filed with or submitted to the [S.E.C.], including the
provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or
participating in the preparation of, any such document;
or (iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or a
statement, opinion, or other writing is required . . . to be
filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the
77
[S.E.C.].
In addition, a lawyer retained or (if in-house) directed to
investigate evidence of a material violation, which has been
reported under the up-the-ladder procedures, is deemed to be
78
“appearing and practicing” before the S.E.C.
“Appearing and practicing” does not include a lawyer who: “(i)
76. Id.
77. Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and
Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. §
205.2(a) (adding the standards required by Sarbanes-Oxley section 307). The
S.E.C.’s Standards for Professional Conduct define “appearing and practicing”
before the S.E.C. more narrowly than do the Rules of Practice. Under the latter,
“practicing before the Commission” includes for example, the preparation, or
participation in the preparation, of any paper, by any attorney, filed with the
S.E.C. in any document. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(f). The Standards, however, define
“appearing and practicing” before the S.E.C. as communicating with the S.E.C. “in
any form”; representing an issuer in connection with an S.E.C. administrative
proceeding or investigation (including informally such as S.E.C. requests for
information and inquiries, as well as subpoenas); providing advice in respect of
the United States securities laws or S.E.C. rules regarding any document filed with
the S.E.C., “including the provision of such advice in the context of preparing, or
participating in the preparation of, any such document”; and providing advice on the
need to file any document with the S.E.C. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a) (emphasis added).
The italicized language requires that securities law advice be rendered, and thus
appears to be a retreat from the position of the Rules of Practice, which make the
preparation of a filed document “practicing before the Commission” regardless
whether securities law advice is provided.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(5) (2004).
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Conducts the activities [described above] other than in the context
of providing legal services to an issuer with whom the attorney has
an attorney-client relationship; or (ii) Is a non-appearing foreign
79
attorney.”
4. Sanctions for Violation of the Attorney Conduct Rules
Rules for attorney conduct lack influence if they are not
enforceable. SOX section 602 therefore provides that the S.E.C.
may censure a violating lawyer or deny the violator the privilege of
80
appearing and practicing before it. The S.E.C.’s implementing
81
rules echo this authority, and, in addition, expressly authorize the
S.E.C. to “subject such attorney to the civil penalties and remedies
for a violation of the federal securities laws available to the
Commission in an action brought by the Commission
82
thereunder.” The latter phrase potentially could bring into play
the full spectrum of remedies available to the S.E.C. in civil or
83
administrative proceedings.
5. Role of the “Qualified Legal Compliance Committee”
No discussion of the new standards for professional conduct
governing securities lawyers would be complete without mention of
the “qualified legal compliance committee” (“QLCC”). An issuer
may form a QLCC to take responsibility for legal compliance
84
issues.
The QLCC must include at least one member of the
issuer’s audit committee and two or more independent members of
the issuer’s board of directors (that is, directors who are not

79. Id. § 205.2(a)(2). See also § 205.2(j)(1-3)(defining a “foreign attorney” as
a lawyer who is licensed outside the United States, who does not advise on U.S.
securities laws except in conjunction with a U.S. attorney, and who only
incidentally does things that would otherwise be “appearing and practicing”
before the S.E.C.).
80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 602, 116 Stat. 745, 794
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3) (adding § 4C to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(b).
82. Id. § 205.6(a).
83. A full discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly,
however, these include injunctions, orders for disgorgement, civil penalties, forced
resignations, and disbarment or suspension. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d)(2) (2000); S.E.C. Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e).
84. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k).
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85

employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer). The QLCC need
not contain any lawyers. Perhaps that is not surprising since up-theladder reporting will in most cases terminate with the issuer’s audit
86
committee, which likewise need not contain any lawyers.
A QLCC comes into play in two situations: (1) when the
reporting lawyer elects to report directly to the QLCC rather than
to the chief legal officer; or (2) the reporting lawyer reports the
matter to the chief legal officer, who instead of taking action
personally, refers the matter to the QLCC. The QLCC must
establish written procedures for accepting, maintaining and
87
considering such reports in a confidential manner.
A QLCC must have at least the following authority:
(i) To inform the issuer’s chief legal officer and chief
executive officer . . . of any report of evidence of a
material violation . . . ; (ii) To determine whether an
investigation is necessary regarding any report of evidence
of a material violation . . . and, if it determines an
investigation is necessary or appropriate, to: (A) Notify
the audit committee or the full board of directors; (B)
Initiate an investigation, which may be conducted either
by the chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) or by
outside attorneys; and (C) Retain such additional expert
personnel as the committee deems necessary; and (iii) At
the conclusion of any such investigation, to: (A)
Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer implement
an appropriate response to evidence of a material
violation; and (B) Inform the chief legal officer and the
chief executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) and
the board of directors of the results of any such
investigation under this section and the appropriate
88
remedial measures to be adopted . . . .
Additionally, the QLCC must have authority to take all other
appropriate action, including notifying the Commission in the
event that the issuer fails in any material respect to implement the
89
QLCC’s recommendations.
Most issuers will probably establish a QLCC because such a
committee is more likely to prepare a coordinated response to

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. § 205.2(k)(1).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(k)(2).
Id. § 205.2(k)(3).
Id. § 205.2(k)(4).
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evidence of securities law problems than the chief legal officer, who
may not have procedures developed in advance to deal with such
issues. In addition, a QLCC involves the issuer’s board at an early
stage of the response, perhaps making an adequate response more
likely.
C. Regulation of Securities Analysts
In June of 2001, New York state investigators announced an
90
investigation of securities analysts at several major securities firms.
The analysts were allegedly compensated in part by fees generated
by investment banking deals with the issuers. The more successful
an issuer was in the markets, the more investment banking business
the issuer would bring to the securities firm and the higher the fees
paid by the issuer (and thus, the greater the analyst’s
91
compensation). Analysts thus were caught in a conflict of interest
because favorable recommendations of an issuer’s securities would
generate business for the analyst’s employer, that, in turn, would
generate substantial bonuses and salary increases for the analyst.
Analysts, therefore, were transformed from impartial researchers of
a company’s prospects to promoters of the company’s stock. After
the market bubble burst, analysts continued to issue optimistic
forecasts for securities whose prices were plunging, prompting an
investigation by the attorney general of New York that the federal
92
regulators ultimately joined.
Among other things, the
investigators made public certain e-mails among analysts and other
brokerage employees in which the analysts spoke derisively of
securities they were simultaneously recommending to public
93
investors.
The ensuing scandal severely eroded investor
confidence in the markets and ultimately led to a settlement
between regulators and the securities firms totaling approximately
94
$1 billion.
90. Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, Affidavit in
Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law Section
354, at 2, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf
(last visited May 19, 2004); Scott Thurm, When Do Analysts Cover Their Own
Interests?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2001, at C1.
91. Spitzer, supra note 90, at 3-5.
92. Id.; Charles Gasparino, SEC Launches Inquiry into Wall Street Research, WALL
ST. J., May 1, 2002, at C3.
93. Spitzer, supra note 90, at 11-12.
94. Randall Smith & Aaron L, Lucchetti, How Spitzer Pact will Affect Wall Street,
WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at C1.
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Against this background it should come as no surprise that
SOX regulates securities analysts, and that SOX regulation of
analysts is focused on conflicts of interest. Section 501 of SOX
requires either the S.E.C. or the SROs to adopt rules regulating
95
securities analysts and research reports. In the spring of 2003, the
S.E.C. adopted Regulation AC (“Analyst Certification”), pursuant
96
to SOX and the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
Regulation AC is likely just the first step in regulation of analysts,
and it treads somewhat cautiously. It requires that analysts’ written
research reports must include certifications of two kinds. First,
analysts must certify that all of the views expressed in the research
report accurately reflect the analyst’s personal views about the
97
subject security or issuer.
In addition, a written report must
include either a statement attesting that the analyst’s compensation
is not related to the specific recommendations or views expressed
in the research report, or, if that is not the case, accurate disclosure
of the source, amount, and purpose of such compensation, and
that the compensation could influence the recommendations or
98
views expressed in the research report.
In addition to providing written research, analysts also often
appear publicly to discuss their views of particular securities and
issuers. In some respects, public appearances may be even more
dangerous than written reports; it is possible that investors would
respond even more rapidly to a public appearance, for example on
television, than to a written report. Accordingly, Regulation AC
prohibits any analyst compensation based on the views the analyst
99
expresses in a public appearance. Under Regulation AC, analysts
must certify each calendar quarter that the views expressed by the
analyst in all public appearances during the quarter accurately
reflected the analyst’s personal views at that time about any and all
100
of the subject securities or issuers.
Further, analysts must certify
that no part of their compensation was, is, or will be directly or
indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views
95. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501(a), 116 Stat. 745,
791 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6) (adding § 15D to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934).
96. Final Rule: Regulation Analyst Certification, Exchange Act Release No.
33-8193 (Feb. 20, 2003), 17 C.F.R. § 242.500-242.505 (2003).
97. Id. § 501(a)(1), 17 C.F.R § 242.501.
98. Id. § 501(a)(2).
99. Id. § 502, 17 C.F.R § 242.502.
100. Id.
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expressed by the research analyst in any public appearances.
Regulation AC, however, does not completely discharge the
burden of analyst regulation under SOX, which requires the S.E.C.
to regulate in more areas than just conflict of interest. Briefly, SOX
requires the Commission to promulgate rules: (1) restricting
prepublication clearance or approval of research reports by
investment bankers or others not directly responsible for
investment research (other than legal or compliance staff), (2)
prohibiting supervision and evaluation of analysts by investment
bankers, (3) prohibiting retaliation against analysts for negative or
unfavorable reports that may adversely affect the securities firms’
investment banking relationships, (4) defining periods of time
during which securities firms involved in a public offering are
prohibited from publishing research reports related to the offered
securities, (5) requiring disclosure by analysts of any investments
they have in the issuer that is the subject of their report, (6)
establishing institutional protections for analysts against pressure
from investment bankers, and (7) requiring disclosure whether an
issuer whose securities are recommended in a report is or in the
past year has been a customer of the securities firm. In addition,
the S.E.C. and SROs may address other issues they deem
102
appropriate.
So far we have considered the SOX provisions regulating
certain persons involved professionally in the securities business,
from accountants to lawyers and investment analysts. Missing from
the discussion to this point have been the issuers themselves. They,
too, are regulated by SOX, and it is to them we now turn.

III. ENHANCED CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
A. Officer Certifications
The corporations involved in the scandals that prompted the
passage of SOX had, without exception, manipulated their
disclosures to investors in various ways. While SOX regulation of
securities professionals is an attempt to reduce such manipulation
101. Id.
102. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745, 791
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6) (adding § 15D to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
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indirectly by making the necessary professional help significantly
more difficult to obtain, SOX also aims directly to enhance
disclosure by public companies via several means.
First, the issuer’s management is now required to certify the
issuer’s financial information as accurate and complete. SOX
103
104
contains both civil
and criminal
provisions requiring
certification of financial data. Each requires both the CEO and the
CFO (or their equivalents) to certify as accurate the financial
105
information in the company’s reports filed under the 1934 Act.
By June 2003, the Justice Department had already filed charges
106
against a corporate officer under section 906.
Issuer reports under the 1934 Act also must contain officer
certifications that the issuer has in place adequate “disclosure
107
controls and procedures.”
Disclosure controls and procedures
are the processes the issuer uses to ensure that management knows
of all information, financial and non-financial, necessary for the
issuer to meet its reporting and disclosure obligations accurately
108
and timely.
In addition to these “disclosure controls and procedures”
certifications, each annual report under the 1934 Act (i.e., Forms
10-K or 10-KSB) must include management’s report on internal
accounting controls, and the report of the issuer’s outside auditors
109
Internal accounting controls are
on management’s report.
different from disclosure controls and procedures, which are
discussed above. Internal controls are the processes the issuer has
in place to ensure that the financial reports prepared by its
accountants are accurate and complete; they are a control used to
ensure that the financial information the issuer generates actually
reflects its own financial condition.
While some internal
accounting controls are also disclosure controls, there are instances
where there is no overlap. For example, an issuer might require
103. Id. § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
104. Id. § 906(a), 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350).
105. Id. §§ 302(a), 906(a).
106. See United States v. Smith, No. CR03-PT-126-S (N.D. Ala., plea entered
Mar. 19, 2003).
107. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7262).
108. Id.; Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238 (June 5, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229,
240, 249, 270 and 274 (2003).
109. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404(b).
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two signatures on checks over a certain amount. That would be an
internal accounting control, but might not be a disclosure
110
control.
B. Section 16 Reports
111

Section 16 of the 1934 Act requires certain “insiders” of the
issuer to file reports disclosing their ownership of the issuer’s
securities and any changes in that ownership. The insiders
required to report include the issuer’s directors, officers, and
holders of more than ten percent of any class of the issuer’s equity
securities. There is a vast amount of scholarship addressing section
16; the purpose of this section is not to summarize section 16 but
rather to highlight the changes made by SOX.
First, SOX amended the 1934 Act section 16(a) to require
section 16 insiders to file statements reflecting changes in their
ownership of the issuer’s securities within two business days of the
112
change.
In addition, the S.E.C. has adopted rules requiring the
electronic filing of section 16(a) reports and, if the issuer maintains
113
a corporate web site, posting of the reports on the web site.
C. Off-Balance-Sheet Transactions
Each annual and quarterly report filed with the S.E.C. must
disclose “all material off-balance sheet transactions” and all
“relationships of the issuer with . . . persons, that may have a
114
material . . . effect on” the issuer’s financial condition.
This
requirement is another response to the Enron bankruptcy, which
was precipitated in part by Enron’s immense exposure in off115
balance-sheet transactions with entities controlled by its own
110. See Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, supra
note 108.
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2000).
112. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 403(a), 116 Stat. at 788 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding § 16(a)(2)(c)).
113. Id. Final Rule: Mandated Electronic Filing and Website Posting for Forms
3, 4 and 5, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8230 (May 7, 2003), 17 C.F.R pts. 230,
232, 239, 240, 249, 250, 259, 260, 269 and 274 (2003) (adopting amendments to
Regulation S-T, Rule 16a-3, Forms 3, 4 and 5).
114. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 401(a), 116 Stat. 785 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m) (amending § 13(j) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
115. Off-balance sheet transactions are transactions that, under generally
accepted accounting principles, need not be disclosed to investors in the issuer’s
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116

insiders.
SOX also instructed the S.E.C. to study the use of offbalance sheet techniques and to report the results to Congress
along with its recommendations for additional or different
117
regulation.
D. Pro Forma Financial Information
Issuers often present “pro forma” financial information in
various documents provided to investors. Such information is
designed to present results “as if” certain things were true or “as if”
certain things had (or had not) taken place. Because pro forma
information is not presented in accordance with GAAP, it could
mislead investors who are unable to decipher for themselves what
such information would look like if it reflected actual operating
results and were reported under GAAP. SOX therefore requires
that pro forma information be (a) presented so as not to mislead
investors, and (b) reconciled with the issuer’s reports prepared
118
under GAAP.

financial statements, and therefore do not appear on the balance sheet. As an
example, the financial results of a company that is not a subsidiary, but merely an
investment of the issuer, need not be consolidated with the issuer’s results on the
issuer’s financial statements.
116. See supra note 115. See also Final Rule: Disclosures in Management’s
Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate
Contractual Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8182 (Jan. 28, 2003), 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003). For example, suppose E Corp. wants to
engage in certain risky transactions without disclosing the risks. E Corp. decides to
purchase a minority interest in a partnership, the majority of which is owned by E
Corp.’s CFO. Because E Corp. owns only a minority interest, it is not required to
consolidate the partnership’s financial results with its own. With such “off-balancesheet” transactions, E Corp. can report as income whatever profit it receives from
its investment. Before SOX, the risks of the investment did not have to be
disclosed to E Corp.’s shareholders or the market because the risks “belong to” the
partnership rather than to E Corp., and the partnership’s financial results are
unconsolidated with E Corp.’s. In many cases this is acceptable, as the partnership
is merely an investment. But suppose the partnership were capitalized with E
Corp. stock, and further that if the partnership loses money, E Corp. will be
required to issue more stock. In this case E Corp. actually is bearing most of the
economic risk of the partnership. (Aficionados of corporation law will also
immediately recognize the self-dealing in transactions where the issuer provides
nearly all the capital to a partnership in which the issuer’s CFO is the majority
partner.) Under SOX, the risks of enterprises borne by the issuer must be
disclosed.
117. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 401(c).
118. Id. § 401(b).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 4
SCHAUMANN-READY.DOC

1338

5/20/2004 8:21 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

E. Earnings Releases and Similar Announcements
The S.E.C. also has amended Form 8-K to require that
earnings releases and similar announcements made to the public
119
be furnished to the S.E.C. The trigger for this requirement is the
disclosure of material information regarding a completed fiscal
120
The press release or other announcement is to
year or quarter.
be appended as an exhibit to a current report on Form 8-K;
however, the exhibit will not be considered “filed” with the S.E.C.
and the criminal penalties that might otherwise apply to false
121
filings will therefore not be triggered.
Similarly, the exhibit
would not be automatically incorporated by reference in another
122
document filed with the S.E.C.
F. Code of Ethics for Financial Officers
Under SOX, issuers must disclose whether or not they have a
code of ethics that applies to their respective senior financial
123
officers and, if not, why not. Any change in such a code must be
124
“immediately” disclosed on Form 8-K.
In this context, “code of
ethics” means standards that are reasonably necessary to promote
(a) honest and ethical conduct; (b) accurate, timely, and
understandable disclosure in the issuer’s periodic reports; and (c)
125
compliance with law and regulations.
Although SOX does not
require issuers to have such a code, its requirement to disclose the
absence of such a code and to state reasons why no code is in place,
seems clearly intended to apply pressure toward having a code.
G. Financial Expert on Audit Committee
SOX requires issuers to disclose whether or not they have on
119. Final Rule: Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8176 (Jan. 22, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 244 and
249 (2003) (adopting Regulation G and changes to Form 8-K).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7264).
124. Id. § 406(b).
125. Id. § 406(c); Final Rule: Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Jan. 23,
2003),17 C.F.R. pts 228, 229 and 249 (2003); Disclosure Required by Sections 406
and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; Correction, Exchange Act Release No.
33-8177A (Mar. 26, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228 and 249 (2003).
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their audit committees at least one member who qualifies as a
126
If no member of the audit committee is a
“financial expert.”
127
financial expert, the issuer must disclose why.
Although the
financial expert provisions are framed in terms of disclosure, the
goal, as with the code of ethics, appears to aim at pressuring issuers
to include at least one financial expert on the audit committee.
H. Real-Time Issuer Disclosures
All issuers required to report under 1934 Act §§ 13(a) or 15(d)
must disclose to the public on a rapid and current basis additional
information, to be specified by the S.E.C., concerning material
128
changes in the financial condition or operations of the issuer.
129
These disclosures must be in plain English.
I.

Enhanced S.E.C. Review of Periodic Reports

SOX also requires the S.E.C. to step up the number of reviews
130
In
it conducts of issuers’ periodic reports under the 1934 Act.
addition to suggesting a number of criteria the S.E.C. may use to
131
determine when review is indicated, SOX also requires that all
issuers that report under 1934 Act §§ 13(a) or 15(d) be reviewed at
132
least every three years.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS
Although corporate governance issues are generally
considered to be a matter of state corporation law, Congress clearly
believed that flawed governance was partly to blame for some of the
financial scandals of 2001-02. SOX therefore includes a number of
provisions that modify the way corporations are governed, with a
special emphasis on strengthening the role of the audit committee.
In addition, most loans made by issuers to their directors or
executive officers are prohibited, and the latter are prohibited
126. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407(a), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 7265).
127. Id.; Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, supra note 125.
128. Id. § 409, 116 Stat. at 791 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (amending §
13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 408(a), 116 Stat. at 790 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7266).
131. Id. § 408(b), 116 Stat. at 790-91.
132. Id. § 408(c), 116 Stat. at 791.
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from attempting improperly to influence the conduct of audits of
the issuer.

A. Audit Committee Reforms
Many of the Act’s substantive governance reforms are directed
at strengthening and enhancing the role of the audit committee as
a sort of corporate “watchdog.” First, no security of an issuer can
be listed on a national securities exchange unless the issuer is in
133
compliance with the audit committee requirements. If the issuer
has no audit committee, its entire board will be deemed to
constitute the audit committee (and will be subject to the audit
134
committee standards).
1. Audit Committee Responsibilities
An audit committee is directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the
issuer’s registered public accounting firm regarding its audit
135
The committee is also responsible
reports and related matters.
for resolving any disputes between the outside accountants and
136
management over financial reporting,
and the outside
137
All
accountants must report directly to the audit committee.
audit and non-audit services performed by the issuer’s outside
138
accountants must be pre-approved by the audit committee.
The
latter is a significant change from previous practice, when the
relationship with the outside accountants was controlled by the
issuer’s management.

133. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Standards
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220
(Apr. 9, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 247 (2003) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
134. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 205(a), 116 Stat. at 773-74 (to be codified at 15
U.S.C § 78c) (adding § 3(a)(58) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
135. Id. § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1) (adding §
10A(m)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
136. Id. (adding § 10A(m)(4)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
137. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(2)(2003).
138. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 202, 116 Stat. at 772 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(i)(1)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See supra
notes 42-48 and accompanying text (regarding pre-approval, in “regulation of
accountants”).
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Audit committees must establish procedures for receiving,
handling, and dealing with complaints regarding accounting,
139
internal controls, or auditing matters.
In addition, the audit
committee must establish procedures permitting the confidential,
anonymous submission of concerns by the employees of the issuer
140
regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.
The
audit committee must have authority to hire independent counsel
141
and other advisers as it deems necessary to help it do its job.
Issuers must provide funding for the audit committee’s payment of
compensation to outside accountants and to any advisers hired by
142
the audit committee.
2. Audit Committee Membership
143

As noted above, issuers must disclose whether or not they
have on their audit committees at least one member who qualifies
as a “financial expert.” The goal of this “disclosure” requirement
appears to be to pressure issuers to include at least one financial
expert on the audit committee. Congress used a similar strategy in
144
other sections of SOX.
It is difficult to challenge the wisdom of
having at least one expert in this role. For this purpose, “experts”
are persons having a deep understanding of financial accounting,
acquired through experience as (or by supervising) high-level
financial officers or public accountants. Other relevant experience
may also be considered in deciding whether someone is a financial
145
expert. However, being named as a financial expert on the audit
139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(4)(A) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
140. Id. (adding § 10A(m)(4)(B) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(3)(2003).
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(5) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3(b)(4).
142. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776-77 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(6) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3(b)(5).
143. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
145. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Mar. 3, 2003) 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and
249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited
May 19, 2004); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177A (Mar. 31, 2003), 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/33-8177a.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
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committee does not automatically make the named person an
expert for other purposes, e.g., for purposes of the “due diligence”
146
defense under Securities Act section 11.
Each audit committee member must be a member of the
147
In addition, each audit committee
issuer’s board of directors.
member must be independent, meaning that (a) no member may
receive fees from the issuer, other than fees for service on the audit
committee, the board, or other board committees; and (b) no
148
audit committee member may be an “affiliate” of the issuer.
There are some situations, however, in which requiring complete
audit committee independence would be burdensome, and the
S.E.C.’s rules provide that an issuer “going public” (that is, not
previously required to file 1934 Act reports) need only to have one
independent member of the audit committee for ninety days after
the effectiveness of the IPO registration statement. After ninety
days, but before the first anniversary of effectiveness, only a
149
majority of the audit committee must be independent.
Similarly, it often happens that the board of directors of two
affiliated companies—for example, a parent and a subsidiary—are
identical or have some members in common. As long as a director
serving on the boards of two or more affiliated companies meets
the other requirements for independence from each company, she
146. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177 (Mar. 3, 2003) 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and
249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited
May 19, 2004); Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Correction, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8177A (Mar. 31, 2003), 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
33-8177a.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(3) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. §
240.10A-3(b)(1)(i)(2003).
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§78j-1) (adding § 10A(m)(3)(B)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1). “Affiliate” is
defined as a person controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the
issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(c)(1)(i). “Control” is defined the same way that it is
in SA rule 405 (i.e., the power to direct or cause the direction of the management
and policies of the issuer). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 405. The following persons are
deemed to be affiliates of the issuer: executive officers of an affiliate of the issuer,
directors who also are employees of an affiliate of the issuer, general partners of
an affiliate of the issuer, and managing members of an affiliate of the issuer.
Persons who are neither executive officers nor own more than ten percent of any
class of voting equity securities of the issuer are deemed not to be “affiliates” (and
thus are allowed to serve on the issuer’s audit committee). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A3(e)(1)(ii)(A).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(A).
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will not be considered an affiliate solely because she serves on the
150
board of an affiliated company.
In any case, the S.E.C.’s exclusion of “affiliates” from the audit
committee is only the starting point for defining the independence
of audit committee members. Stock exchanges and markets, in
particular, are well-positioned to raise the bar for independence
even higher by adding additional requirements to their standards
for listing issuers’ securities. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ have
proposed standards, discussed below, tougher than those mandated
by the S.E.C. to ensure audit committee independence.
a. NYSE Proposed Standard for Independence
The New York Stock Exchange proposal goes well beyond what
SOX requires, in that an independent director for NYSE purposes
has no direct or indirect material relationship with the issuer.
Former employees of the issuer or the outside accountants (and a
few additional categories of persons) would not be considered
independent until five years had passed from the date of their most
151
recent employment with either the issuer or the accountants.
b. NASDAQ Proposed Standard for Independence
The NASDAQ market has also proposed a definition of
independence that, as applied to audit committee members, would
exclude anyone receiving payments other than director’s fees, and
anyone who is the executive officer of a charity that received
152
substantial contributions from the issuer.
Similar to the NYSE
standard, former employees of the issuer or its accountants, and
some others, would not be considered independent until three
153
years have passed since their disqualifying employment.
150. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(B).
151. Self Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. relating to
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47672 (Apr. 11, 2003), 68
Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/3447672.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
152. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change
and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. Relating to Proposed Amendments to NASD Rules 4200 and 4350 Regarding
Board Independence and Independent Committees, Exchange Act Release No.
34-47516 (Mar. 17, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 14,451 (Mar. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-47516.htm (last visited May 19, 2004).
153. Id.
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B. Prohibition Against Personal Loans
SOX prohibits personal loans from an issuer (or its affiliates)
154
Because issuers
to a director or executive officer of the issuer.
have historically advanced funds to directors and officers in a wide
variety of situations, the exact reach of the prohibition is still
unclear.
Loans by certain issuers are exempted from the
prohibition; issuers that have a consumer credit business may make
personal loans to directors and executive officers if the loans are on
the same terms and of a type generally made available to the
155
public.
Of course, loans of a type and on the terms available to
the public are not generally as attractive to the issuer’s directors
and officers as the previously available, favorable loans.
Advances of litigation expenses incurred by officers or
directors as the result of their service to the issuer may or may not
be “personal loans.” Officers and directors are often entitled to
such advances as a matter of contract right, either by a provision in
their employment agreements or by a corporate bylaw. Perhaps
the answer will depend upon whether the officer or director wins
or loses the lawsuit. A win might make the litigation advance a
contractual right; a loss, on the other hand, often involves the
individual repaying the advances to the issuer and thus might be
considered a “personal loan.”
Issuers often fund short-term loans to directors and officers for
the exercise of stock options. These loans are usually repaid within
days, when the underlying stock is sold. The exercise price is
refunded to the issuer, and the officer or directors keeps the
difference between the exercise price and the market price. Such
plans are called “cashless option exercise.” Similarly, many issuers
obtain and pay for life insurance on officers and directors. When
the insured individuals can borrow against the value of the policy,
this is called “split-dollar” insurance. Such arrangements can be
characterized as loans from the issuer, since the value against which
the loan is made has been funded by the issuer. The status of plans
like split-dollar insurance and cashless option exercise under SOX
is currently unknown.

154. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402(a), 116 Stat. at 787 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(m)) (adding § 13(k)(1) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
155. Id. (adding § 13(k)(2) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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C. Prohibition Against Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits
SOX section 303 states that it is illegal for an officer or director
of an issuer to try to influence an audit in a way that violates S.E.C.
156
rules, and under section 303, the S.E.C. has adopted new 1934
157
Act rule 13b2-2(b). Subdivision (1) of this rule prohibits officers
and directors (and their respective agents) from coercing,
manipulating, misleading, or fraudulently influencing the issuer’s
auditors when the officer, director or other person knew or should
have known that the action, if successful, could result in rendering
158
the issuer’s financial statements materially misleading.
For
example, it would be an attempt to improperly influence an audit if
an officer or director were to try to persuade auditors to issue or
reissue a report on an issuer’s financial statements that is not
warranted in the circumstances (due to material violations of
generally accepted accounting principles, generally accepted
auditing standards, or other professional or regulatory standards),
or not to perform audit, review, or other procedures required by
generally accepted auditing standards or other professional
standards, or not to withdraw an issued report, or not to
159
communicate matters to an issuer’s audit committee.
If an issuer has to restate its financial reports due to
misconduct, its CEO and CFO must reimburse the issuer for any
bonus or compensation based on equity (e.g., stock options,
“phantom” stock, etc.) received during the twelve months after the
defective, later-restated report was filed, plus profits from the sale
160
of securities during the same twelve-month period.
D. No Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackouts
“Pension fund blackouts” are periods when pension fund
participants may not engage in trades of the securities held in their
accounts. In the Enron case, many employees were furious to learn
that during a pension fund blackout—and while Enron’s stock
price was plummeting—senior executives were cutting their losses

156. Id. § 303(a), 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7242).
157. Final Rule: Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,47890 (May 20, 2003), 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (2003).
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1).
159. Id. § 240.13b2-2(b)(2).
160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
7243).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

31

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 4
SCHAUMANN-READY.DOC

1346

5/20/2004 8:21 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

by selling large quantities of Enron stock. The employees, of
course, were prohibited from selling during the blackout. SOX
responds to this by prohibiting the directors and executive officers
of an issuer from selling the issuer’s equity securities if a pension
161
fund blackout is in effect.
This prohibition applies to all equity
securities acquired in connection with service or employment as a
162
director or executive officer.
Insider transactions are prohibited
when a pension fund blackout (a) lasts for more than three
business days and (b) suspends the ability of at least fifty percent of
the plan participants to engage in plan transactions involving the
163
164
Issuers must notify plan participants,
issuer’s equity securities.
their directors and executive officers, and the S.E.C. of any
165
blackout.
V. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT
In addition to the many changes and additions to the law
made by SOX and already described, SOX creates new crimes,
stiffens penalties for existing crimes, enhances the S.E.C.’s
enforcement authority, extends the statute of limitations in private
actions for securities fraud, protects whistleblowers in securities
cases, and provides that debts arising from judgments in securities
cases are not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
A. Crimes
Under SOX, it is now a crime to tamper with, hide, or destroy
documents with the intent to impede or influence an investigation
by a United States government agency; the penalties include fines
166
and imprisonment for up to twenty years. Another newly created
crime relates to accountants’ maintenance of audit records and
work papers; accountants are required to maintain all records

161. Id. § 306(a), 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 306(a)(4).
164. Id. § 306(b), 116 Stat. at 780 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1021)
(amending § 101 of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) by adding (i)(2)).
165. Id. § 306(a)(6).
166. Id. § 802(a), 116 Stat. at 800 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519). The
same conduct can often be prosecuted under federal obstruction-of-justice laws,
but the advantage of the newly created SOX crime is that it is relatively easy to
prove and carries a stiff sentence.
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167

related to an audit for five years after the audit. Failure to do so
168
may result in a fine and imprisonment for up to ten years.
SOX also created a new crime of defrauding shareholders of
169
public companies. The offense is defined as actual or attempted
170
fraud in connection with a security of an issuer regulated by SOX.
171
The punishment is a fine and up to ten years in prison.
Under
the new regime requiring officers to certify issuers’ financial
statements, it is also a crime for a corporate officer to falsely certify
172
173
financial statements contained in a report filed with the S.E.C.
SOX amends the existing crime of “tampering with a record or
174
otherwise impeding an official proceeding” by adding the offense
of actual or attempted alteration, destruction, or concealment of a
record or other object to impair its availability for use in an official
proceeding, or other corrupt actual or attempted obstruction of or
influence on an official proceeding. This crime is punishable by a
175
fine and up to twenty years’ imprisonment.
B. Criminal Penalties
In addition to broadening the conduct that is considered
criminal, SOX enhances sentencing for financial crimes, fraud and
obstruction of justice. First, SOX increases the prison sentences for
176
SOX also
mail and wire fraud from five years to twenty years.
increases the prison sentences for violation of ERISA from one year
to ten years; fines for ERISA violations are increased for individuals
from $5000 to $100,000, and for others from $100,000 to
177
$500,000.
Similarly, SOX increases the penalties for individuals
who violate the 1934 Act from a fine of $1 million and a prison
term of ten years, to a fine of $5 million and a prison term of
167. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(a)).
168. Id. (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1520(b)). See Retention of Records
Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8180 (Jan. 24, 2003),
17 C.F.R. pt 210 (2003).
169. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §807(a) 116 Stat. at 804 (to be codified by adding 18
U.S.C. § 1348).
170. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
171. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807.
172. See supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text.
173. Id. § 906, 116 Stat. at 806 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1350). See supra
note 105 and accompanying text.
174. Id. § 1102, 116 Stat. at 807 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 903, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343).
177. Id. § 904, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1131).
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178

twenty years.
The fine for corporate violators is increased from
179
$2.5 million to $25 million.
SOX also requests the United States Sentencing Commission
to review and, if appropriate, amend the sentencing guidelines for
a number of criminal violations, including financial and
180
accounting fraud, obstruction of justice and “extensive criminal
181
fraud,” “fraud and related offenses” committed by officers or
182
and violations of SOX in
directors of public companies,
183
general.
In an action for an injunction under either the 1933 or 1934
Acts, the S.E.C. since 1990 may request the court to bar the
184
defendant from serving as an officer or director of an issuer.
Previously, the standard necessary to impose such a ban was a
showing of the defendant’s “substantial unfitness to serve”; SOX
amended the requirement to eliminate “substantial,” basing the bar
185
on mere “unfitness to serve.”
Finally, in an action for an
injunction brought by the S.E.C. under the 1934 Act, the S.E.C.
may seek any additional equitable relief that “may be appropriate
186
or necessary for the benefit of investors.”
C. Secondary (“Aiding and Abetting”) Violations
To this point we have considered changes in the law explicitly
affecting certain securities professionals—accountants, lawyers, and
analysts. Before 1994, these persons were frequently sued or
prosecuted under theories of secondary criminal liability for aiding
and abetting the primary violations of others (typically issuers). In
1994, however, the Supreme Court held, in Central Bank of Denver,
187
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., that there is no private
178. Id. § 1106, 116 Stat. at 810 (adding § 78ff(a) to § 32(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
179. Id.
180. Id. § 1104, 116 Stat. at 808 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
181. Id. § 805, 116 Stat. at 802 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
182. Id. § 1104.
183. Id. § 905, 116 Stat. at 805 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
184. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000).
185. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305(a), 116 Stat. at 779 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2)) (adding § 77t(e) to § 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933
and § 78u(d)(2) to § 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
186. Id. § 305(b), 116 Stat. at 779 (adding § 78u to § 21(d)(5) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
187. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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right of action against one who aids and abets a rule 10b-5
violation. Indeed, the language of Central Bank was broad enough
to possibly foreclose even S.E.C. actions against aiders and abettors.
To dispel this possibility, in 1995 Congress added section 20(e) to
the 1934 Act, making it clear that the S.E.C. can sue aiders and
188
abettors under rule 10b-5, even though private citizens cannot.
The force of Central Bank may now be diminishing, perhaps as the
result of legislation or perhaps judicial reinterpretation. The
Enron, Worldcom and Adelphia cases, in which investors lost
billions, present a powerful argument for letting private investors
sue secondary actors who facilitate the violations of those primarily
liable.
Section 703 of SOX directs the S.E.C. to study data from 1998
through 2001 to determine (among other things) how many
accountants, accounting firms, investment bankers, investment
advisers, brokers, dealers, lawyers, and other professionals
practicing before the S.E.C. were found to have aided and abetted
a violation of the securities laws but were not sanctioned as primary
189
violators. The Commission is to report to Congress, which, if it is
sufficiently concerned, could take action legislatively to overrule
Central Bank.
At least one court is also trying to avoid the impact of Central
Bank. In the securities class action arising out of the Enron
bankruptcy, the court has ruled that “secondary actors may be
liable for primary violations” of 1934 Act rule 10b-5, as long as the
rule’s requirements are met with respect to each secondary actor
190
and the action is properly pleaded.
Although the court
recognized that the 1995 Act was designed to cut back on securities
litigation by private plaintiffs, the court noted that the 1995 Act “is
a mechanism for winnowing out suits that lack [sufficient]
specificity. It was not meant to let business and management run
191
amuck to the detriment of shareholders.”
VI. CONCLUSION
SOX is likely the broadest and farthest-reaching securities
188. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e) (2000).
189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 703(a).
190. In re Enron Corp. Secs. Derivative & ERISA Lit., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 592
(S.D. Texas 2002).
191. Id. at 593 (quoting Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 435-36
(5th Cir. 2002) (Parker, C.J., concurring)).
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reform legislation passed since the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. Its reach extends beyond merely regulation the issuance and
trading of securities, to corporate governance and the standards
applicable to the practice of accounting and law. SOX is an
ambitious attempt to add “teeth” to the regulation of public
corporations. Ultimately, however, its success will depend upon
corporate compliance. No amount of additional legislation can
guarantee a safe investment environment; in the end, the
continued attractiveness of U.S. capital markets will depend upon
corporate self-regulation.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/4

36

